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1．Introduction
A cooperative and positive relationship between China and Japan is a prerequisite for peace and 
stability not only in Asia, but also worldwide. Lately, the relations became strained in 2012 when Japan 
reasserted its claim of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and China declared in 2013 an Air Defense 
Identification Zone over the East China Sea so that the potential for military conflicts increased 
drastically between two countries. While economic interdependence between China and Japan has 
enormously increased through trade, Japanese investments and foreign aid to China, diplomatic 
relations between these countries has not improved.  Why did economic interdependence fail to 
promote amicable diplomatic relations?  Foreign aid has been an essential foreign policy tool for Japan’s 
diplomacy in Asia.  Yet why did the economic cooperation, which assisted economic development in 
China, not reduce anti-Japanese sentiment?  Why were bilateral relations described as at the “lowest 
point” in 2005 since 1972 when China and Japan normalized diplomatic relations after World War II? 
Examining and analyzing these questions are crucial since the two powers will determine the future of 
a regional stability in East Asia.  First, this study examines the positive and negative outcomes of 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) during the period from1990 through 2006. Second, it 
analyzes Chinese and Japanese nationalisms as major diplomatic obstacles to improving Sino-Japanese 
relations.  Finally, this article analyzes the potential dangers of nationalism and the future of Sino-
Japanese relations. 
2．Japan’s Foreign Aid to China
In 1954, when it joined the Colombo Plan to assist South Asian economic development, Japan started 
to provide ODA.  The Colombo Plan was organized to provide technical and financial assistance to 
Commonwealth countries.  Subsequently, the level of Japan’s ODA increased dramatically in the 1980s. 
In 1989, the absolute level of Japan’s ODA became the largest in the world.1）   For the past sixty years, 
Japanese ODA has played a prominent role in Japan’s foreign policy.  
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Japan began providing ODA to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 after the two countries 
normalized relations in 1972.  Although Japan had wished to resume diplomatic relations with the PRC 
earlier, the United States prevented it from doing so until President Nixon visited the PRC.  Since then 
China had received approximately 3.13 trillion yen in loan aid, 145.7 billion yen in grant aid, and 144.5 
billion yen in technical assistance from Japan until 2005.2）  In the 1990s, China became the largest 
Japanese aid recipient, while Japan had been the largest foreign aid donor to China.  In detail, due to 
requests from the Chinese government, a significant amount of Yen loans was dedicated to economic 
infrastructure development in China (Table 1).  Grant aid has been used for social infrastructure 
development including the China-Japan Friendship Hospital that currently treats about three thousand 
patients a day in Beijing.3）   For technical assistance, over thirty-seven thousand Chinese trainees were 
invited to Japan, and five thousand Japanese experts were dispatched to China between 1979 and 
2003.4）   As a result, Japan’s ODA was utilized for significant economic development projects such as 
Shanghai Pudong International Airport Construction Project, Beijing-Qinhuangdao Railway Expansion 
Project, and Tianshengqiao Hydroelectric Power Project (See more details in Table 1). 
Table 1: Yen Loans for Large-scale Economic Infrastructure Projects  in China
Airports
-Shanghai Pudong International Airport Construction Project (40 billion yen)
-Beijing Capital Airport Terminal Area Expansion Project (30 billion yen)
-Lanzhou Zhongchuan Airport Expansion Project (6.3 billion yen)
-Wuhan Tianhe Aerodrome Construction Project (6.3 billion yen)
-Xi’an Xianyang International Airport Terminal Expansion Project (3.09 billion yen)
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 111.6 billion yen
Railway Lines
-Beijing-Qinhuangdao Railway Expansion Project (67 billion yen)
-Guiyang-Loudi Railway Construction Project (30 billion yen)
-Chongqing Urban Railway Construction Project (27.1 billion yen)
-Beijing Subway Construction Project (19.7 billion yen)
-Datong-Qinhuangdao Railway Construction Project (18.4 billion yen)
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 641.8 billion yen
Roads
-Hangzhou-Quzhou Expressway Construction Project (30 billion yen)
-Liangping-Changshou Highway Construction Project (24 billion yen)
-Xinxiang-Zhengzhou Highway Construction Project (23.5 billion yen)
-Guiyang-Xinzhai Highway Construction Project (15 billion yen)
-Heilongjiang Heihe-Beian Road Construction Project (12.8 billion yen)
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects 272.6 billion yen
Seaports
-Qinhuangdao Port Expansion Project (67.4 billion yen)
-Qingdao Port Expansion Project (59.7 billion yen)
-Huanghua Port Construction Project (15.4 billion yen)
-Shenzhen Dapeng Bay Yantian Port 1st Phase Construction Project (14.7 billion yen)
-Dailain Port Dayao 1st Phase Construction Project (6.7 billion yen)
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 272.6 billion yen
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Power Stations
-Tianshengqiao Hydroelectric Power Project (118 billion yen)
-Jiangxi Jiujiang Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (29.6 billion yen)
-Wuqiangxi Dam Construction Project (25.2 billion yen)
-Shanhe Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (24.6 billion yen)
-Beijing Shisanling Pumped Storage Power Station Construction Project (13 billion yen)
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 488.2 billion yen
Fertilizer Plants
-Weihe Chemical Fertilizer Plant Construction Project (26.9 billion yen)
-Inner Mongolia Chemical Fertilizer Construction Project (21.4 billion yen)
-Jiujiang Chemical Fertilizer Plant Construction Project (21.4 billion yen)
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 106.3 billion yen
Steel Plants
-Shanghai Baoshan Infrastructure Improvement Project (31 billion yen)
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ODA: Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized the importance of providing aid to China, saying 
“Maintaining and advancing stable, amicable relations between Japan and China is conducive to the 
peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and concomitantly to the entire world.”5）  Furthermore, 
the Public Broadcasting Infrastructure Improvement Project (20.2 billion yen loan), the Project for 
Development of the Beijing Center for Japanese Studies (851 million yen grand aid), and Japanese 
Language Instructor to Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture (Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers 
Program) were implemented for promotion of mutual understanding.6）  Thus, Japan’s ODA to China 
was viewed within Japan as a diplomatic effort to establish close Sino-Japanese relations.   
In response, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said at the Japan-China Foreign Minister’s 
Meeting in April 2005 “ODA to China has been playing a significant role in China’s development, and 
for that I would like to express my gratitude. When I exchange opinions with Chinese college students, 
I constantly remind them that when SARS hit, Japan provided the world’s highest amount of assistance 
to China.”7）  However, despite the Chinese official’s comment, the Chinese government has not praised 
Japan-funded ODA projects to the Chinese public.8）  Even more the Chinese people seem not to 
recognize the benefits of a significant amount of economic cooperation from Japan.  
In addition, Japan’s ODA to China was also quickly resumed after the Tiananmen Square incident in 
1989 though the G7 countries decided to impose economic sanctions and suspend high-level diplomatic 
meetings with China at the 1989 summit meeting.  While Japan initially agreed to join the coalition, it 
lifted the sanctions sooner than other countries and resumed its diplomatic relations on the grounds 
that the isolation policy would not work in China.  The Chinese government even appreciated it with 
the statement, “now we know who is a true friend.”9）   Yet Japan’s independent diplomatic efforts after 
the Tiananmen Square incident were in vain since Sino-Japanese relations did not improve at all. In 
sum, it appeared that Japan’s ODA and overtures to the Chinese government were ineffective in 
improving Sino-Japanese relations.  
3．Positive Outcomes: Increased Economic Interdependence
Economic interdependence increased between Japan and China enormously during 1991-2005.  First, 
annual bilateral trade between the two countries was more than US$ 180 billion in 2005, and China 
became Japan’s largest trade partner.  In detail, China became the largest import partner from Japan 
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in 2002,10）  and became the second largest export partner to Japan in 2001.   As Table 2 shows, for 
most years, China had increased its exports by more than ten percent.  On the other hand, although 
China had increased its imports from Japan, the United States was still the largest importer of 
Japanese goods (Table 3).  Japan’s trade deficit with China had increased while China received the 
benefits of economic interdependence by receiving access to the Japanese market (Table 2).  
Table 2: Japan’s Trade Volume with China
(Units: US million)
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance Year to Year
1991 8,593.1 14,215.8 -5,622.7 301.3
1992 11,949.1 16.952.8 -5,003.7 619.0
1993 17,273.1 20,564.8 -3,291.7 1712.0
1994 18,681.6 27,566.0 -8,884.4 -5592.7
1995 21,930.8 35,922.3 -13,991.5 -5107.1
1996 21,889.8 40,550.0 -18,660.2 -4668.7
1997 21,784.7 42,066.0 -20,281.3 -1621.1
1998 20,021.6 36,895.9 -16,874.3 3407.0
1999 23,335.6 42,880.2 -19,544.6 -2670.3
2000 30,427.5 55,303.4 -24,875.9 -5331.3
2001 31,090.7 58,104.7 -27,014.0 -2138.1
2002 39,865.6 61,691.6 -21,826.0 5188.0
2003 57,219.2 75,192.8 -17,973.6 3852.4
2004 73,818.0 94,277.0 -20,459.0 -2485.4
2005 80,340.1 109,104.8 -28,764.7 -8305.7
Source: Based on JETRO, Japanese Trade in 2005, 101.
Table 3: Japan’Major Export Partners
Year 1stCountry (%) 2ndCountry(%) 3rdCountry(%) 4thCounty(%) 5thCountry(%)
1991 United States(29.1) Germany (6.6) S. Korea(6.4) Taiwan(5.8) Hong Kong(5.2)
1992 United States(28.2) Taiwan (6.2) Hong Kong(6.1) Germany(6.0) S. Korea(5.2)
1993 United States(29.2) Hong Kong(6.3) Taiwan(6.1) S. Korea(5.3) Germany(5.0)
1994 United States(29.7) Hong Kong(6.5) S. Korea(6.2) Taiwan(6.0) Singapore(5.0)
1995 United States(27.3) S. Korea(7.1) Taiwan(6.5) Hong Kong(6.3) Singapore(5.2)
1996 United States(27.2) S. Korea(7.1) Taiwan(6.3) Hong Kong(6.2) China(5.3)
1997 United States(27.8) Taiwan(6.5) Hong Kong(6.5) S. Korea(6.2) China(5.2)
1998 United States(30.5) Taiwan(6.9) Hong Kong(5.8) China(5.6) Germany(4.9)
1999 United States(30.7) Taiwan(6.9) China(5.6) S. Korea(5.5) Hong Kong(5.3)
2000 United States(29.7) Taiwan(7.5) S. Korea(6.4) China(6.3) Hong Kong(5.7)
2001 United States(30.0) China(7.7) S. Korea(6.3) Taiwan(6.0) Hong Kong(5.8)
2002 United States(28.5) China(9.6) S. Korea(6.9) Taiwan(6.3) Hong Kong(6.1)
2003 United States(24.6) China(12.2) S. Korea(7.4) Taiwan(6.6) Hong Kong(6.3)
2004 United States(22.5) China(13.1) S. Korea(7.8) Taiwan(6.6) Hong Kong(6.3)
2005 United States(22.6) China(3.4) S. Korea(7.8) Taiwan(7.3) Hong Kong(6.0)
Source: Based on JETRO, Japanese Trade in 2005, 101.
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Figure 1: Trends of Japan’s Imports by Region and Country
Source: Based on the data from JETRO  <https://www.jetro.go.jp>
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Secondly, the interdependence through Japanese direct investment had been promoted during 1991 
and 2004.   For example, the volume of Japanese investment to China was US$ 4.5 billion in 2004, which 
represented an increase of 45.3 % over 2003.  
Figure 2:  Trends of Japan’s Direct Investment by Major Countries
Source: Based on the data from JETRO <https://www.jetro.go.jp>
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In sum, through foreign aid, trade and direct investment, Japan’s government and companies 
contributed to economic development in China.  Thus, Japan became an important economic partner 
for China, and both countries should recognize the mutual economic interests that should not be put at 
risk by political conflicts. 
4．Negative Factors: Deteriorated Sino-Japanese Relationship
Sino-Japanese relations did not improve because three major diplomatic history related obstacles 
were not removed, despite the enormous Japanese economic contribution to China.  First, Japanese 
textbook issues became a major diplomatic issue in 1982 when Japanese high school history textbooks 
were revised to replace the word “shinryaku (invasion)” with “shinshutsu (incusion)” in the description 
of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria.  The Chinese government, along with other Asian governments, 
felt that the textbook revision would provide a misleading account of the history of World War II. 
However, the Chinese government waited one month to lodge a complaint about the issue,11）  since it 
was regarded as a Japanese domestic issue.  Textbook disputes happened again in 1986 and 2001, and 
Japanese history textbooks had been under serious scrutiny by Chinese officials every year.  
Second, Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine had been a major irritant to Sino-
Japanese relations.  Yasukuni Shrine enshrines not only 2.5 million dead soldiers but also fourteen 
“Class A” war criminals from World War II, including Hideki Tojo.  Although all prime ministers have 
justified their visits as paying respects to their ancestors who died for their country, the Chinese 
government could not accept official ministerial visits to honor the war criminals.  For example, Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made his official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 1986.  He was 
condemned for his act by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and cancelled his visit to the shrine 
in 1987.  However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi continued to visit the shrine annually while 
serving his five-year tenure despite strong protests from the Chinese government.  In 2006 when he 
resigned, Koizumi was criticized for severely damaging Sino-Japanese relations since Chinese premiers 
refused to meet with him. Moreover, the Chinese government suspended all high-level official meetings 
with Japan due to his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
The third major diplomatic obstacle was the unresolved territorial disputes over the Diaoyu / 
Senkaku Islands.  After the report from the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in 1969 
indicated potential for a significant amount of oil and natural gas deposits nearby the islands, China 
began to claim sovereignty over the islands although Japan officially declared it’s territorial claim in 
1895 and has exercised physical control since then.12）   This dispute got escalated in February 1992, 
when Chinese government passed the law on Territorial Waters with Chinese sovereignty over the 
Senkaku Islands. In August 1996, members of the Japanese right wing attempted to build a lighthouse 
on one of the islands.  Although the two governments did not allow the issue to become a serious 
obstacle to Sino-Japanese relations at that point, both nations got negative impression of each other 
through this territorial issue.
Three more critical incidents occurred and caused problems during that time.  First, the Chinese 
government indicated its preference that Japan would not obtain a permanent membership on United 
Nation Security Council.  The Japanese government was upset by the Chinese position, since gaining 
the seat on the Security Council has been one of the major goals for Japan’s foreign policy since World 
War II.  In March 2005, the Chinese government sponsored a massive Internet signature campaign by 
the Chinese public against Japan’s bit for the UN Security Council seat.13）  On July 1 2005, an aide to 
the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan received a petition with forty-six million e-signatures and names 
opposing a spot for Japan on the Security Council.14）  China also attempted to intervene in the UN 
reform process so that the process could not make any progress in 2005.15）  Moreover, according to the 
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New York Times, Chinese leaders stated “that Japan did not have the moral qualifications to become a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council” on April13, 2005.16）  
Second, the mass anti-Japanese demonstrations that occurred in April 2005 shocked the Japanese 
public. More than six thousand demonstrators appeared in Beijing to protest new Japanese textbooks.17） 
They demanded a boycott of products made in Japan.  Anti-Japanese demonstrations in downtown 
Shanghai on April 16 featured more angry Chinese people.  Rioters smashed the windows of Japanese 
stores and restaurants, damaged Japanese cars, and burned Japanese flags and photos.  The Japanese 
consulate was also attacked with eggs and paint bombs.18）  The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Qin Gang, 
made an official statement, “This protest was held spontaneously by some Beijing people upset about 
Japan’s wrong attitude and actions on the history of the invasion.”19）  However, a critic of the 
government, Yu Jie argued the demonstrations were orchestrated and the Chinese government used 
them for its own purposes.20）  It is generally believed that the Chinese police do not allow mass street 
demonstrations.  
In addition, Chinese vice Premier Wu Yi’s suddenly cancelled a meeting with Prime Minister 
Koizumi on short notice in May 2005.  Her visit to Japan was expected to improve the bilateral 
relationship in the aftermath of anti-Japanese demonstrations of the previous month.  Although her 
sudden cancellation was officially explained as due to pressing domestic matters, the Japanese public 
was offended by the rude behavior.  In sum, Japanese ODA failed to change the negative views of 
Japan in the PRC, and it appeared to be an ineffective tool to improve Sino-Japanese relations. 
5．Rise of Chinese and Japanese Nationalism
Why was Japan’s ODA not able to improve Sino-Japanese relations despite establishment of 
significant economic interdependence?  Although various issues are involved, this study argues that 
nationalism in both countries hindered the possibility of reconstruction of the deteriorated relationship. 
Nationalism is defined as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity 
and identity of an existing or potential ‘nation’.”21）  In the Chinese case, the government utilized 
nationalism for framing Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Since communist ideology was no longer 
as effective as previously in legitimizing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governance, the CCP 
official ideology shifted toward an increased focus on “patriotism” and “loyalty.” Strong citizen 
identification with the Chinese nation against outsiders was recognized as an effective tool to unify and 
control China.  
Patriotism became the emotional core of the Chinese nationalism.   Professor at Denver University, 
Suisheng Zhao and a diplomatic historian, Michael Hunt argued that Chinese nationalist sentiment was 
always expressed as “patriotism or love and support for China.”22）  Once the term “nationalism” was 
replaced with “patriotism” for the Chinese foreign policy agenda, Premier Zhou Enlai used to state 
“socialist patriotism is not a narrow nationalism, but patriotism aimed to strengthen national pride 
under the guidance of internationalism.”23）   
On the other hand, Japanese nationalism seemed to top-down, defensive and reactive to foreign 
nations and pressure.  Whenever Japan confronted a security emergency such as the nuclear arms test 
conducted by North Korea in 2006, the Japanese government could redefine national interests and 
foreign policy goals.  Until then, the Japanese public was relatively indifferent to national security and 
their identification as Japanese people.  Although anti-Chinese sentiment increased in Japan after anti-
Japanese demonstrations in China, Japanese nationalism was not based on a hatred of specific countries, 
including the PRC.  
For Japanese nationalism, patriotism seemed not to be a very strong component.  According to a 
public opinion poll conducted by the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office in 2005, about fifty percent of 
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Japanese responded that they had stronger patriotic feelings than others, while ten percent said that 
they had weaker patriotic feelings.  Approximately forty percent stated that they were not sure if they 
had patriotic feeling.  However, the same poll showed that eighty percent agreed that Japanese people 
should become more patriotic.24）     
Figure 3: Characteristics of Chinese Nationalism and Japanese Nationalism
Source: Author 
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5.1 Chinese Nationalism25）  
Chinese nationalism seemed to be categorized to have two layers:  state-centered nationalism and 
popular nationalism.26）   St te nationalism is a tool to restore legitimacy and build wide national support 
for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the ideology based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory is no longer effective to unify the nations and to mobilize people 
to achieve its political goals (Seckington, 2005:25).27）  State nationalism was urged to grow through 
extensive patriotic education. In the official discourse, nationalist and patriotic sentiment was 
emphasized as “the patriotism of the Chinese Communist Party is the highest example of the Chinese 
nation an  Chinese patriotism.”28）   
The Tiananman Square incident in 1989 prompted China to reform the educational system.  Deng 
Xiaoping realized the needs for more patriotic education because the demonstration at the Tianaman 
Square clearly show d the lack of loyalty to the CCP (Shimizu, 2003).  Suisheng Zhao expl ined “Beijing 
launched an extensive propaganda campaign to educate the people in patriotism. The campaign 
appeared to nationalism in the name of patri tism as  way to ensure the loyal y of a population 
stewing in domestic discontent. At the core was ‘education in national conditions’ ( guoqing jiaoyu), 
which emphasized how China’s unique national conditions make it unprepared to adopt Western style 
liberal democracy.”29）  As a result, many students became more nationalistic than democratic, because 
of the educatio al reform promoted by Jiang Zemin.  Jiang also emphasized the significance of patriotic 
anti-Japanese education in 1994.  The schools had ingrained more anti-Japanese sentiment into the 
younger generation than before.30）          
Nationalism was stoked in China both by popular sentiment as well as by the CCP as a policy tool. A 
bestseller, China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post-Cold War Era was published 
by five previously unknown young writers right after the United States and China had a military 
confrontation in the Taiwan Strait in 1996.  This book was realized as different from the official 
discourse on nationalism. Wang Xiaodong’s China’s Path under the Shadow of Globalization was also 
well known as a popular nationalistic book, which also criticized the Chinese government’s policy.31） 
The aforementioned e-signatures petition to oppose Japan’s bid for permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council and anti-Japanese mass demonstrations in 2005 occurred and supported by popular 
nationalism.   
Therefore, Chinese nationalism has popular support as well as support from the Chinese government 
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for its own purposes. In general, nationalism tends to be more powerful when people perceive the 
common enemy as an evil threat.  In the Chinese case, Japan became the evil common enemy that 
united the state and popular nationalism, and assisted in maintaining cohesion within the nation-state. 
The state nationalism emphasized patriotism and a strong Chinese position toward Japan using the 
history of World War II to satisfy popular nationalism.  For example, the anti-Japanese mass 
demonstrations in major cities in 2005 were started by popular nationalism while state nationalism 
allowed them to be bigger and powerful.  However, the Chinese government took actions later to 
prevent anti-Japanese demonstrations from turning into anti-government movements since popular 
nationalism is also critical of the CCP. 
Anti-Japanese sentiment was an effective tool for Mao Zedong to raise nationalism in China in 1932. 
After the Japanese invasion, Mao managed to establish the anti-Japanese nationalist united front with 
Chiang Kai-shek.  The CCP also succeeded in creating new mass-based peasant nationalism.32）   For the 
first time, the Chinese peasantry experienced a threat from outside.  Mao finally found the most 
efficient method to organize the CCP as a cohesive entity.  Thus, anti-Japanese nationalism was already 
recognized as the most effective and powerful means for the CCP to achieve its political goals before 
World War II.  
5.2 Nationalism under Jiang Zemin 
Chinese nationalism was strongly pursued under Jiang Zemin’s presidency.  Wang Huning, a 
presidential advisor for Jiang Zemin, believed that nationalism was a useful tool in state-building.33） 
Jiang recognized that he needed to demonstrate a powerful political leadership. He was different from 
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping since Mao and Deng were charismatic revolutionary Chairmen, while 
Jiang was a technocrat who was appointed to be a successor by Deng Xiaoping.  Nationalism with anti-
Japanese sentiment playing the history cards was an effective vehicle for his stable presidency.   In 
addition, it is widely believed that Jiang Zemin dislikes Japan because he had unpleasant personal 
experiences with Japanese occupation troops during World War II.34）  
Unlike Jiang, Mao and Deng dealt with historical issues differently on the diplomatic front.  For 
example, although Mao Zedong used anti-Japanese sentiment to raise nationalism among peasants and 
establish a cohesive nationalist united front, Mao did not use the anti-Japanese nationalistic ideas for his 
power and politics after World War II.    It was documented that Mao showed his appreciation to 
Japanese Socialist Party members saying “Thanks to your military invasion, the CCP could take 
political power from the Nationalist Party (KMT).  The Imperial Army indeed gave us excellent 
lessons.”35） Deng Xiaoping also indicated once that history should not be an obstacle to  future Sino-
Japanese relations.  When Deng visited Japan to ratify the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, 
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda made his formal apology for the past.  In response, Deng stated “We 
have a two thousand-year diplomatic history, while unfortunate periods existed in the Sino-Japanese 
relations.  However, we settled the history issues when China and Japan normalized the relationship.”36）    
On his visit to Japan in November 1998, Jiang Zemin attempted to demonstrate his strong nationalist 
position on history problems.  Jiang insisted on including a Japanese official apology for the invasion of 
China during World War II in the China-Japan joint declaration.  It was a new request which was 
prompted by the fact that South Korean president, Kim Daejung reached an agreement for a written 
apology in the Korea-Japan joint declaration in the previous month.  Yet, it was criticized: “Jiang’s relative 
lack of authority in China drove him to take a hard line on Japan as a means of drumming up support 
from the military or conservative factions in Beijing.”37）  Jiang’s request was denied since the formal 
apology had been set forth in the 1972 Joint Statement, as well as in the Emperor’s speech in 1992.38）   
Although Jiang’s visit to Japan was assessed as unsuccessful diplomacy later in the PRC, the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs praised his efforts for settlements of historical issues on its website: 
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During his state visit to Japan in 1998, President Jiang gave a comprehensive, through and systematic 
elaboration of China’s principles.  The Japanese side recognized its aggression against China for the first time 
and expressed its profound introspection and apology to the Chinese people.  The Two sides mutually confirmed 
that it was an important basis for developing Sino-Japanese relations to recognize history correctly. 39）  
Meanwhile, Japanese nationalism was also raised through the disagreement on the wording of the 
China–Japan declaration.  First, the Japanese public expressed their anger towards the Chinese 
demands for apology.  The Japanese major newspapers reflected public opinion on this point.  Second, 
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, for domestic political purposes, needed to show his firm attitude against 
foreign pressure.  Since he was regarded to be a weak leader in domestic political arena, Obuchi 
utilized the opportunity to alter his image through foreign policy.40）  
Jiang Zemin officially gave his power up when he resigned as the CPC Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission in 2004.  Yet Jiang continued to have political influence on members of the 
Politburo Standing Committee after Hu Jintao succeeded to the Chinese presidency.  Although Hu’s 
position on the history problems had not changed from Jiang’s, Hu did not articulate his own vision on 
Sino-Japanese relations at that time. 
5.3 Mass Media and Public Opinion in China
Due to the introduction of a quasi-market economy, Chinese society obtained more variety and a 
greater range of mass media.  Yet the Chinese governments attempted to exercise more control and 
increase censorship.  The CCP required the mass media to follow its orders with respect to patriotic 
education.41）  According to a research conducted by Harvard University, more than fifty thousand 
websites were blocked to access in China due to possibilities for negative effects on the CCP 
governance.42）   
According to Ming Wan’s research, the Chinese media focused on select negative images of Japan, and 
was highly critical of Japan at that time.  “Intensive Chinese media coverage of a series of scandals 
involving Japanese tourists, companies, and exchange students in recent years has contributed to the 
growing negative perception of Japan among Chinese.”43） 
Furthermore, a survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun and the Chinese Institution of Social Science in 
2002, showed that fifty-three percent of Chinese respondents disliked Japan, while ten percent said that 
they liked Japan.  In compared to the same survey in 1997, twenty percent more people responded that 
they disliked Japan though the percentage of the people who said that they liked Japan did not change.44） 
On the other hand, nineteen percent of Japanese respondents said that they liked that they liked China in 
2002, while seventeen percent said that they disliked China.  Sixty-two percent responded that their 
feeling is neutral [Dochirademo nai].  In the1997 survey, twenty-nine percent responded that they liked 
China, while nineteen percent said that they dislike China.  There was little change in the percentage of 
the Japanese people that said that they disliked China between 1997 and 2002.  
Anti-Japanese sentiment among the young generation is stronger than among older people who 
actually experienced World War II.  According to a survey done by the Financial Times in March 
2004, eighty percent of Internet users in China indicated that they dislike Japan.45） This social 
phenomenon might be explained by the patriotic education started in the 1990s.   
5.4 Nationalism in Japan
Japanese nationalism seemed to be characterized by a top-down system.  For example, the Japanese 
government passed a bill to amend the Fundamental Law of Education, allowing a revision to the basic 
educational law to require teaching patriotism. One of the major daily newspapers, Asahi Shimbun 
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stated:
Both the draft amendment and the current law, which was put into force in 1947, say that the aim of education 
is “full development of personality” and to foster “builders of a peaceful state and society.”  But where the 
draft differs from the current law is that it has added an article titled “Objectives of Education,” under which 
come more than 20 moral provisions that include such issues as patriotism and “respect for tradition and 
culture.”  Loving one’s nation is a natural reaction, and the draft also says children should learn to respect other 
nations.  But we have repeatedly warned that spelling out such things in a law could be tantamount to setting 
a rigid teaching standard for how people should love their country.46） 
Although the proposal to require teaching patriotism was supported by ten percent of Japanese 
people at the beginning,47） the government party, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), pursued the 
amendment as an indispensable reform to improve the Japanese educational system.  Finally according 
to the Asahi Shimbun poll of May 24 2006, fifty-six percent responded that they agreed the amendment, 
while twenty-nine percent said that they disagreed.  Thus, more than one-year debate on the patriotism 
among politicians persuaded the Japanese public to support a significant change of the Japanese 
educational system.  
Japanese nationalism could be also described as reactive and defensive.  The Tiananmen Square incident 
in 1989 provided a negative impression of China to Japanese public, with a sharp increase in percentage of 
respondents feeling “not close to China” in the Prime Minister’s Office poll. Although approximately seventy 
percent responded that they “felt close to” China in 1988, only fifty-one percent said the same thing in 
October 1989 (Figure 4), equating to nearly a twenty percent drop in the rating.  Japanese negative feeling 
toward China increased again in 2005 due to the anti-Japanese demonstration in May 2005.  
Figure 4: Japanese Perception of China (1986-2006)
Source: Based on Japanese Prime Minister’s Office’ poll results
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The military threats from China and North Korea raised a defensive nationalism in Japan.  According 
to the public opinion poll conducted by Gallup and Yomiuri Shimbun in December 2006, eighty percent 
of Japanese respondents said that North Korea was a military threat to Japan, and fifty-five percent 
responded that China was a military threat.48）  Especially since North Korea succeeded in a nuclear 
arms test in October 2006, Japanese public opinion had supported more emphasis on national security. 
The Self-Defense agency was raised to the level of the Ministry of Self-Defense in January 2007, and 
preparation for revising the Japanese constitution was considered.  In addition, forty-six percent of 
Japanese respondents said that the Japanese nation should consider obtaining nuclear weapons, while 
fifty-one percent responded that Japan should not consider doing so.49）  This was a significant change 
in Japanese public opinion because revising the Three Non-Nuclear Principles used to be taboo. 
Kokka no Hinkaku (The Dignity of the State) by Masahiko Fujiwara, a mathematics professor, was 
one of the 2006 bestsellers in Japan.  Fujiwara argued that Japan needs spiritual more than logical 
development, better Japanese language education than speaking English, and following Bushido more 
than democracy.  In particular, he advocated that Japan needs to regain the dignity of national dignity. 
As The Japan That Can Say No was a controversial nationalist book, which sold over a million copies in 
1989, Kokka no Hinkaku is a 2007 version of The Japan That Can Say No.  Fujiwara emphasized that 
Japan should not concur with American democracy, imperialism, or globalization.  Japan could be a 
unique nation to be proud, and patriotism is important for Japanese people.  This defensive argument 
toward globalization and Americanism offered a justification to strengthen Japanese nationalism. He 
also asserted that patriotism is human nature and its highest aspiration, though it was misused before 
and during World War II. Fujiwara denied that he is nationalist. However, his book inspired the top-
down and defensive Japanese nationalism like Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara’s book; The Japan 
That Can Say No.   
5.5 Nationalism under Junichiro Koizumi
Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister despite not being a leader of the largest faction in the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2001. It was the first time that factional politics did not determine 
the LDP presidency.  He was also called “Mr. Clean,” since he broke ties with the Mori faction to 
which he used to belong, and he was not involved in political corruption and scandals.  Koizumi 
implemented many political reforms including the privatization of the postal office, which was the 
largest financial institution in the world at that time.  He was a popular prime minister who served five 
years in office, and his victories in the 2003 and 2005 elections encouraged Koizumi to be an engaged 
powerful political reformer.     
At first, Koizumi attempted to maintain good relations with China by offering his “heartfelt apology” 
for Japan’s aggression against China before and during World War II when Koizumi visited China in 
2001.  However, Due to Koizumi’s visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, Sino-Japanese relations again 
deteriorated.  Prime Minister Koizumi strengthened his domestic political position by continuing to 
visit the Yasukuni Shrine and he claimed how the Japanese people honor the victims was an internal 
issue.  Though Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated, Koizumi remained very popular in Japan while he 
was prime minister. Thus, Yasukuni visits provoked Chinese nationalism, but strengthened him 
domestically by playing on Japanese nationalism.     
Although Junichiro Koizumi ended his thirty-year affiliation with the Mori faction when he became 
prime minister, his political socialization and agenda were influenced by the Mori group.  In history, 
Kishi’s faction succeeded to the Fukuda, Abe, Mitsuzuka, and Mori faction in 2001.  The LDP factions 
inherit political, social and economic networks in domestic and international settings.  For instance, 
taking Southeast Asia as an important region for Japan’s Asian diplomacy had been a characteristic of 
the Fukuda, Abe, Mitsuzuka and Mori factions’ approaches.50）  Koizumi formerly worked as a secretary 
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to the late Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda.  Kishi and Fukuda built strong political and personal 
connection in Southeast Asia through their diplomacy.  On the other hand, the Hashimoto faction 
maintained strong personal connections with the Chinese government and business because Kakuei 
Tanaka was the founder of the faction, and he normalized the relationship with China in 1972.  Thus, 
Koizumi failed to improve Sino-Japanese relations due to the lack of his motivation and leverage to 
influence counterparts in China.  
5.6 Mass Media and Public Opinion in Japan
Japanese mass media had assisted in conveying negative images of China through their coverage of 
China.  Especially, the image of “an undeveloped civil society,”  “military threats,” and “a crumbling 
social-market economy” are typical phrases that promote negative public opinion on China in Japan.51） 
China’s rising economic power in Asia was also perceived as a threat to Japan. Raising fears was that 
China would take over leadership in Asia.52） According to the study of three major newspapers 
coverage on China in 2004 and 2005 conducted by Rikkyo University, there were some different trends 
in Asahi, Yomiuri and Nikkei Newspapers.  All newspapers increased the news coverage of China in 
200553）  due to the anti-Japanese demonstrations in March 2005 and the cancellation of Chinese vice 
Premier Wu Yi’s meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi.  Yet Asahi Shimbun kept a fair stance to cover 
news objectively, and was critical of both governments, while Yomiuri Shimbun was more critical of 
China than other newspapers.  Nikkei Shimbun increased its news coverage most among the three. 
However, Nikkei tented not to be opinionated on Sino-Japanese relations. Over all, Japanese newspapers 
did not particularly encourage anti-Chinese sentiment even when Chinese nationalism became 
aggressive toward Japan. 
Figure 5: Japanese Perception of Other Countries and Regions (2006)
Source: Based on Japanese Prime Minister’s Office, “Public Opinion Polls on Social Affairs.”
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As Figure 4 showed, though Japanese view of China had shifted between 1986 and 2006, the views of 
China overall were not strongly negative.  More than fifty percent of Japanese respondents stated that 
they felt close to China in the1980s, while more than sixty percent said that they did not feel close to 
China in 2006.  Yet if negative incidents did not occur going forward, the two perceptions might go 
back to approximately fifty: fifty over time.   
China was not the only country that the Japanese public did not feel close to as Figure 5 shows. The 
Japanese public had an even more negative image of Russia and Middle East.  The same survey 
revealed that the percentage of Japanese respondents professing to feel close to Russia or Middle East 
had never exceeded twenty percent in the past.54）  On the hand, the United States and European Union 
established relatively stable and favorable relationships with Japan. 
6．Conclusion and Implication of Deteriorated Sino-Japanese Relations
Sino-Japanese relations failed to improve, despite the fact that Japan’s ODA and direct investment 
increased economic interdependence between two countries. There were two levels of analysis that 
explains the deteriorated relations: international and domestic levels. General changes in the 
international structure, such as the end of the Cold War, were also significant to consider the reasons 
why China and Japan cannot cooperate. After the Cold War was over, Russia and the United States 
placed less emphasis on strategic interests in East Asia, while the post-Cold war system created 
opportunities for other states to compete for regional leadership. The shift in the balance of power in 
East Asia could explain Jiang’s diplomatic stance toward Japan.  In addition to international factors, 
this study focused on domestic factors in both China and Japan to analyze the deterioration in Sino-
Japanese relations because it hypothesized positive economic effects on the relationship were hindered 
by Chinese and Japanese nationalistic sentiment.  Chinese nationalism was embedded in assertive, 
positive and aggressive patriotic ideas.  On the other hand, Japanese nationalism was defensive and 
reactive, and rose as a response to the Chinese patriotic nationalism.  Foreign aid could not be an 
effective diplomatic tool when the two nations did not recognize the positive consequences of increased 
economic interdependence. 
In 2012, Xi Jinping became the new Chinese president and Shinzo Abe came back as a Japanese 
prime minister for his second term.  President Xi is reported to be under Jiang Zemin’s political 
influence, and Xi can use anti-Japanese sentiment to reinforce his own position as leader. Nationalism 
has been a very powerful political tool for the Chinese Communist Party to unify the country and 
legitimate their power. Prime Minister Abe also seems to have different political priority from his first 
term because Abe visited the Yasukuni shrine although he knew doing so would cause Sino-Japanese 
relationships to deteriorate. While saying “The door for dialogue is always open,” and calling for face-
to-face talks with Xi, Abe is nonetheless taking actions he must be aware are harmful to the 
relationship, calling into question his sincerity.  President Xi and Prime Minister Abe have finally met 
on November 10, 2014 since they came to power, but it is possible that both may utilize nationalism for 
their own domestic political advantage. To avoid and manage further conflicts and dispute in order to 
ensure peace and stability in East Asia, it will be increasingly important for the government of both 
China and Japan to attempt to downplay nationalism or at least channel it in a positive direction rather 
than using it to demonize the other.
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